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College in 1897 and heard Theodore 
Roosevelt speak as Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy; but for the future admiral, 
the Naval War College became a much 
more important aspect of his career�
In the early part of his career, William 
Jr� served under William S� Sims in the 
destroyer flotilla, along with Dudley 
Knox and others� Knox may have been 
the key to the younger Halsey’s assign-
ment to the Office of Naval Intelligence 
in 1920 and six months later as naval 
attaché in Berlin, where he reported 
extensively on German naval develop-
ments in the early years of the Weimar 
Republic� In 1932–33, Captain Halsey Jr� 
followed his father’s earlier example by 
attending the Naval War College� One 
of his classmates was another future 
five-star admiral, Captain Ernest J� King� 
Halsey and his wife lived in Jamestown 
and commuted daily across the bay to 
the College� Although no star student at 
the Naval War College, he was initially 
considered as a choice for the faculty� 
After some false starts with other orders, 
Halsey eventually went on in the next 
year to the Army War College, then 
located in Washington, DC, where 
his classmates included Jonathan 
Wainwright and a future Army five-star 
general, Omar Bradley� Again he did not 
distinguish himself academically, but his 
time there gave him unusual perspective 
as one of the very few to graduate from 
both the Army and Naval War Colleges�
However, that may well have been 
Washington’s way of putting him 
in a holding pattern preparatory to 
going on to the aviation positions that 
Admirals Leahy and King had been 
recommending for him� In 1934, Halsey 
went to Pensacola for training as a flight 
observer, but soon bent the rules of the 
system to earn his pilot’s wings as the 
oldest newly qualified naval aviator, 
at the age of fifty-two� Thus, Halsey 
cleared the way for a series of aircraft 
carrier commands that eventually led 
to his wartime career in the Pacific�
Hughes has researched Halsey’s wartime 
career carefully and writes judiciously 
and with great authority using his 
extensive new research� Among many 
interesting points, Hughes finds an 
explanation for the mysterious skin 
ailment that forced Halsey out of 
commanding the Enterprise Task Force 
just before the battle of Midway in 
1942� While a fungal infection probably 
caused dermatitis, it likely was related 
to a bacterial infection in five of his 
teeth, all of which Dr� Warren Vaughan, 
a noted dermatologist from Richmond, 
Virginia, brought under control in 
early 1943 so that Halsey could return 
to command in the Pacific theater�
Controversies about Halsey as a combat 
commander undoubtedly will continue, 
and Hughes’s excellent book will not be 
the last word on the subject, but there is 
no doubt that it should be the first book 
on the subject that one should consult�
JOHN B� HATTENDORF
The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense 
and American Strategy in Asia, by Ian Easton� 
Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2017� 406 
pages� $20�
Ian Easton examines and discusses 
in fair detail the difficulties that the 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) would face during an invasion 
of Taiwan� He provides overall orders 
of battle for both Taiwan and China; 
explains which beaches on Taiwan are, 
or are not, suitable for invasion; provides 
monthly historical estimates of the 
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weather with which an invasion likely 
would have to contend; and describes 
the defenses and policies Taiwan has 
created to deter, or defeat, such an 
invasion� Easton also describes, albeit 
to a lesser degree, some of the aspects of 
the Chinese bombardment and blockade 
campaigns that likely would precede 
or accompany an invasion of Taiwan�
The author builds a case that China’s 
military is well aware of the many 
problems and issues that would have 
to be overcome if the PLA were to 
invade Taiwan successfully, and that 
Taiwan is well positioned, trained, and 
equipped to repel such an effort� He 
concludes that “Taiwan has little to fear 
of invasion for right now” (p� 272)�
A strength of the book is that the 
author uses current and authoritative, 
or at least well-situated, Chinese and 
Taiwan sources in making his estimates� 
Consequently, the bibliography is a 
valuable resource for anyone devoted to 
studying the military balance across the 
Taiwan Strait� Also noteworthy is the 
fact that the author of this volume works 
at the 2049 Institute� Furthermore, 
he acknowledges Mark Stokes as a 
long-term mentor and thanks Randal 
Shriver, until recently the 2049 Institute’s 
director, for his leadership and support� 
Stokes, of course, is as knowledgeable 
about many aspects of the PLA as any 
Westerner, and Shriver currently serves 
as Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs� Read-
ers therefore can assume that the book 
offers insights into some of the current 
administration’s potential inclinations 
regarding defense support to Taiwan� In 
those important ways, the book is im-
pressively informed and worth reading�
Despite those strengths, the author’s 
sincere sympathy for Taiwan leads to a 
tendency to overreach, which sometimes 
results in unsubstantiated assumptions� 
For example, while demonstrating 
that Taiwan will have ample strategic 
warning of a Chinese invasion, he 
asserts that in the immediate run-up to 
an invasion “farm animals, especially 
pigs, would be gathered in huge herds 
to feed the troops” (p� 76)� One wonders 
why the invading forces would require 
substantially more fresh pork than they 
consumed beforehand� On the next page 
he writes, “Shipyards would probably 
be operating at breakneck speeds for at 
least three months prior to the invasion, 
working on 24 hour shifts and brightly 
lit up at night� Light and noise travel 
great distances over water, making them 
easy to pickup with submarines and 
surveillance ships�” That any such in-
creases in noise and light could correlate 
definitively to landing ship construction, 
from miles offshore, and through a peri-
scope, is at best doubtful� This tendency 
toward inconsistent logic is repeated on 
page 97, where he asserts, “China cannot 
effectively blockade Taiwan without 
bombarding it and Taiwan cannot be 
bombed until it has been blockaded�” 
Another example occurs on page 259, 
when in a discussion of the perils of 
mirror imaging he states, “It is too easy 
to forget that reality and facts are things 
that are arbitrary and subjective�” Better 
editing would have helped this volume�
More significantly, the author’s bias for 
Taiwan sometimes leads to dubious 
conclusions� An example occurs when 
the author states that “Taiwan’s spy-
catchers have discovered and arrested 
traitors soon after China has recruited 
them, ensuring that security breaches 
were short lived” and that “experts point 
out that Taiwan has done an extraordi-
nary job in recruiting well-placed agents 
in China who can provide early warning 
information to the Presidential Office 
(and the White House)” (p� 70)� One 
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hopes that Taiwan’s counterintelligence 
efforts are indeed that good, but readers 
probably recall that the John Walker spy 
ring operated for over fifteen years in the 
United States during the Cold War, caus-
ing enormous harm� Doubtless, Taiwan 
works hard to catch spies—as did the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation during 
the Cold War—but it just does not 
seem credible that Taiwan is immune 
to effective Chinese espionage efforts� 
Readers also might be forgiven for 
doubting the author’s claim of Chinese 
counterintelligence ineptitude if recent 
reports in the press describing Beijing’s 
destruction of Central Intelligence 
Agency networks in China are accurate�
The perils inherent in the book’s 
analytical tilt in favor of Taiwan extend 
to other areas, perhaps most critically 
to the author’s assessment (which relies 
on some of his previous, similar work) 
that the threat that China’s conventional 
missile force and counterair systems 
pose to Taiwan’s air force and navy is 
manageable� This is important because 
if this conclusion is wrong Taiwan’s 
exposure to Chinese bombardment 
and blockade, and even invasion, is 
far higher than the author asserts� 
This vulnerability—which depends on 
whether Chinese long-range precision 
strikes can be effective against Taiwan’s 
defenses—will remain a critical factor 
in Taiwan’s ability to deter or withstand 
Chinese uses of force� The implications 
of this competition extend far beyond 
Taiwan� This work would be better 
if it had addressed this issue more 
thoroughly� Another subject that falls in 
this category of insufficient treatment 
is China’s ability to use its maritime 
militia during an invasion of Taiwan�
Nonetheless, there is value in this 
book� Its sources, and the author’s 
background and experiences, provide a 
basis for optimism regarding Taiwan’s 
ability to resist an invasion, which 
the author relates enthusiastically�
WILLIAM S� MURRAY
Congress Buys a Navy: Politics, Economics, and 
the Rise of American Naval Power, 1881–1921, by 
Paul E� Pedisich� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2016� 304 pages� $39�95�
The subject of Paul E� Pedisich’s newest 
work, Congress Buys a Navy: Politics, 
Economics, and the Rise of American 
Naval Power, 1881–1921, is apparent 
from its title� Pedisich proposes that it 
was Congress—rather than the ex-
ecutive branch—that was most directly 
responsible for funding and building 
the U�S� Navy during this pivotal period� 
This well-researched work considers 
four decades of presidential actions, 
congressional legislation, and USN 
policy and their role in the buildup of 
U�S� naval power and capabilities�
These four decades (1881–1921) are 
in many ways the most important in 
U�S� naval history and development, 
spanning the aftermath of the Civil War 
through the end of the First World War� 
At the beginning of this period, Pedisich 
demonstrates the relative feebleness of 
the U�S� Navy in comparison with Euro-
pean naval powers, most notably Great 
Britain� However, this study demon-
strates how the efforts of nine presidents 
and their cabinets, sixteen Secretaries 
of the Navy, and innumerable members 
of Congress were able to transform the 
U�S� Navy from a neglected, presteel, 
and defensively focused organization 
into—in the aftermath of World War 
I—the world’s premier naval power�
Pedisich’s study is notable for its focus 
on the legislative branch’s central place 
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